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SUMMARY
Environmental policy instruments have an impact on the incentives to invest in environmental
R&D and this link should deserve careful consideration when introducing new instruments.
Some authors argue that evironmental taxes and tradable permits have rather comparable impacts
on environmental R&D but we think that only very specific conditions do lead to this kind of
conclusions. If we broaden the perspective by integrating elements from the Industrial
Organisation literature and depart for Pigouvian settings, a market-driven approach would link
the incentive to invest in new technologies to the market potential offered by the policy
instruments. If taxes turn out to be very expensive for the polluting or emitting industries, we can
assume that these targeted firms would be more interested to invest in new - emission reducing
- technologies than in cases where the choosen policy instrument will lead to a very limited cost.
We therefore developed a dynamic model that enables to compare the incentives on
environmental R&D resulting from taxes, emission trading, voluntary approaches and
subsidizing environmental R&D. We do not claim to capture all relevant market interactions, but
our findings confirm the intuition that environmental taxes have a clearly different impact on
environmental R&D compared to emission trading.
Keywords : Research and Development, environmental policy, environmental taxes, emission
trading, voluntary approaches, market interactions
JEL Classification : Q28, O31, H233
NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Economists argue that market incentives will create opportunities for entrepreneurs to develop
new products and processes. It is clear that many environmental problems need new technologies
to eliminate the detrimental externalities. Waiting for these new clean technologies to arrive
would be unacceptable and too risky and therefore environmental policy designed many
instruments that should lead to a market behaviour that enables it to internalize external effects.
Environmental policy instruments all have an impact on the incentives to invest in environmental
R&D and this link should deserve careful consideration when introducing new instruments.
Some authors argue that evironmental taxes and tradable permits have rather comparable impacts
on environmental R&D but we think that only very specific conditions do lead to this kind of
conclusions. If we broaden the perspective by integrating elements from the Industrial
Organisation literature and depart for Pigouvian settings, a market-driven approach would link
the incentive to invest in new technologies to the market potential offered by the policy
instruments. If taxes turn out to be very expensive for the polluting or emitting industries, we can
assume that these targeted firms would be more interested to invest in new - emission reducing
- technologies than in cases where the choosen policy instrument will lead to a very limited cost.
We therefore developed a dynamic model that enables to compare the incentives on
environmental R&D resulting from taxes, emission trading, voluntary approaches and
subsidizing environmental R&D. We do not claim to capture all relevant market interactions, but
our findings confirm the intuition that environmental taxes have a clearly different impact on
environmental R&D compared to emission trading.
The market - in terms of potentially avoidable costs -created by environmental taxes is always
more important than the market resulting from a system of tradable permits that only captures
emission reductions. This finding holds even when environmental taxes are low and permit prices
much higher. Only when permits would be auctioned from the beginning of the programme, the
impact on the incentive for environmental R&D would be comparable. We also found indications
that other instruments like voluntary agreements and subsidies for technological R&D have a
more interesting impact on the incentive for R&D compared to emission trading. In our model
we could integrate and compare these four instruments since we included the cost of innovation
and various parameters for uncertainty.
Our final conclusion is that environmental taxes, without important exceptions or escape clauses,
offer the most clear incentives for the needed technological innovations.4
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For many environmental problems, technological innovations can offer fundamental solutions,
especially when behavioural changes are limited by various inertia. Our industrial and
technological infrastructure that did lead to significant externalities, can be transformed to limit
detrimental environmental impacts. This transformation process is already happening very
smoothly since environmental considerations started to influence  all engineering and industrial
designing phases. During the coming decades, our technological infrastructure will no longer be
characterized by >brute-force= manipulation of scarce natural resources.
Efficiency could and should lead to sufficiency and sustainability (Huber, 1998). If this positive
scenario works out, the most convinced >technology-believers= would even suggest that
stringent and costly environmental policies could be postponed. For some areas like global
warming policy, this possibility is considered because many scientific uncertainties could lead
to the too early implementation of costly measures. We believe however that the strategy of
waiting for superior technologies could turn out very disappointing. Like all other goods,
technological products need an interesting market that stimulates the process of entrepreneurial
and Schumpeterian dynamism. New technologies need to be commercialized and without clear
and credible  environmental policies or the threat to impose environmental measures in the near
future, such markets for new technologies do not exist. Waiting has always a price in terms of
lost opportunities and therefore we argue that an accelerated technological innovation and
diffusion should be stimulated by the appropriate choice of environmental policy instruments.
This consideration has already frequently been made during the 1970s and 1980s (Magat, 1979
; Milliman and Prince, 1989) but recent environmental policy has not generally focused on the
positive connection between environmental improvement and technological innovation. A
possible explanation is that the early environmental movement often preoccupied itself with the
adverse impacts of technology (OECD, 1997).
In the economic literature, many studies on the different effects of environmental policy
instruments are based on the seminal paper by Weitzman (1974). He concluded that taxes should
be prefered to quantity controls when expected marginal benefits were relatively flat. The relative
curvature of the cost and damage functions is only part of the reason for preferring taxes.
Weitzman also noted that when shocks to costs and benefits are correlated, this simple intuition
breaks down (Pizer, 1997 ; Stavins, 1996).
Basic elements of Industrial Organization literature were integrated by authors like Biglaiser and
Horrowitz (1995) and Parry (1995, 1996). These authors work with Pigouvian taxes and permit
price levels equalling marginal environmental damage under perfectly competitive conditions
with homogeneous firms in terms of production and abatement costs. These market conditions
are hard to find what makes the conclusions of the studies difficult to generalize.
Parry (1996) concludes that the incentives for environmental R&D are empirically similar under
the Pigouvian tax and under the Pigouvian quantity of permits when innovations are minor and6
there is a well-functioning permit market. In our work, we will depart from Pigouvian settings
of taxes and quantities and illustrate that the different impact on the incentive for Research and
Development (R&D) resulting from taxes or permits is very significant.
Furthermore, each sector or environmental problem has very specific characteristics that are not
found in other industries or policies objectives. As a result, the >overall= effects of the
environmental regulation on R&D tends to be ambiguous (Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995).
In this paper, we have the ambition to work out in more detail the linkages between
environmental instruments and the behaviour of the innovating sector. We introduce an 
investment decision that is made by firms that have the potential to invest in environmental
R&D. We see innovation as an endogeneous and continuous process. By the latter, we mean that
the decision to innovate - not to compare with the decision to imitate - can be made at any
moment in our analysis and not only at the starting point of the simulation.
In our approach, firms are not identical. Each of the polluting firms has different marginal
abatement costs. To capture these differences in our model, we make use of probability density
functions.
2. Presentation of the model
In our model, we work with  two sectors ; the group of polluting firms and the group of firms
investing in R&D to provide an abatement technology to the polluting sectors.
The group of the polluting firms causes the externality and is the target of the environmental
policy. Government can use various instruments like taxes, tradable permits, technological
standards, performance standards, product bans, environmental agreements and the disclosure
of environmental information (e.g. compliance records). Each instrument has a different impact
on the process of technological innovation and diffusion. A comparative approach would be
preferred but is only possible for a limited selection of all available instruments. We therefore
prefer to simulate the incentives for environmental R&D that are the result of specific
instruments. Our findings could be an interesting complement to algebraic or game-theoretical
approaches.
2.1 The polluting sector
We assume that abatement costs for the polluting firms differ. This is a realistic assumption in
line with the findings of Hartman, Wheeler and Singh (1994) who used the U.S. Department of
Commerce=s annual 20000-plant random survey of pollution abatement costs and expenditures
(PACE). For 37 sectors, the average abatement costs in $US (1993) per tonne were calculated
for seven air pollutant categories : suspended particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides
and carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, lead, hazardous (toxic) emissions and other emissions.7
They concluded that maximum/minimum ratios are frequently near ten, and occasionally near
one hundred. Abatement costs for a selection of air pollutants and US industries are presented
in Table I.






Food 86 521 229 162 46612
Leather 132 377 8430 633 132
Industrial chemicals 46 75 304 213 1300
Chemical products 212 681 48 157 29
Metal products 343 1563 461 399 161
Electrical machinery 373 483 1559 215 365
Transport equipment 635 1266 468 1006 468
Motor vehicles 350 1523 1155 2441 21483
Source : Hartman, Wheeler and Singh, 1994, p.4
Another conclusion from the empirical analysis was that scale economies may apply to some
abatement processes. 
The polluting industry can develop its own abatement technologies or can buy technological
solutions provided by the technological sector. Since end-of-pipe solutions were  used for air
pollution abatement, the data by Hartman e.a.(1994) are in most cases  payments to technology
providers. In our model, we assume that the polluting industry will always buy clean
technologies. There will be no in-house development because these firms have no experience
with environmental technology development and commercialization.
If abatement costs for air pollutants can vary from $10 to $ 46000 per tonne (Hartman e.a., 1994),
it will be very complicated to determine ex-ante the optimal Pigouvian tax or permit price. We
think it is useful to assume that abatement costs follow a normal distribution over the polluting
firms.
2.2 The innovating sector
In our model, we consider the decision to innovate and the marketing of the resulting innovations
as endogeneous. The innovating sector operates in a commercial environment and will base its
decision to invest in environmental R&D on factors like the cost of the innovation, the chance8
to achieve technological success, the discounted profits following from the commercialization,
the rate of return of the project and the possibility of patent protection. In our threshold
innovation model, we assume that firms want to invest in innovation if the cost of innovation
(CI) does not exceed a critical value, determined by the discounted profits from innovation.
We calculate these discounted profits from innovation (DPI) for i years as :
DPI = r￿ [(pi - ci)*qi]/ (1+r)
i ,
 with  pi = price for technology on the market ;
ci = cost of producing the technology ;
qi = quantity sold to polluting industries ;
r = internal rate of return ;
ñ = success probability (technical success and the possibility to commercialize the
innovation) or uncertainty factor (0 < r < 1)
Investing in technological innovations is an activity with many business risks. We follow the
approach indicated by Mansfield and identify three different success probabilities : (1) the
probability that technological goals would be achieved ; (2) the probability that, conditional upon
technical success, the resulting product or process would be commercialized ; and (3) given
commercialization, the probability that the project yielded a return on investment at least as high
as the opportunity cost of the firms capital (Scherer and Ross, 1990).
Scherer and Ross (1990) also present the empirical results of the investigations by Mansfield. For
the firms in his analysis, the average probabilities were :
Technical success (r1) 0.57
Commercialization, given technical success (r2) 0.65
Financial success, given commercialization (r3) 0.74  
with r = r1* r2*r3 (=0.274)
It is clear that the choice of the used environmental policy instrument has a strong impact on the
probability of realizing a financial success but not on the technical success probability. Suppose
that in this example, the best environmental policy results in a financial success probability of
0.95 compared to a probability of only 0.55 for the worst policy option, the difference in total
success probability would be 0.15 (0.35 - 0.20) what is much less than two times 0.20. 
Some authors link total success probability to the number of firms that invest in environmental
R&D. The higher  the number of involved firms, the more limited is the probability of financial
success.  This is a reasonable assumption in the case when there is only one technology that can9
be innovated and developed. In reality, many technologies offer positive environmental outcomes
and we have a competition among new technologies on the market. For many pollution
abatement possibilities, there is also a competition between new clean technologies and new
cleaner inputs. Car emissions can be reduced by diverse types of new engines (electric vehicles,
fuel cell vehicles, hybrid vehicles, engines using compressed air,...), the increased use of weight-
saving materials and the introduction of cleaner and alternative fuels (low-sulphur fuels, biofuels,
ethanol, methanol,...).
When analysing the findings of Hartman e.a.(1994), we think that the differences in sectoral
abatement costs are partly explained by different technological needs for each sector and for each
pollutant to abate.
We also should be aware of cluster economies or external economies of scale resulting from 
collective or simultaneous R&D efforts. Spill-over effects can generate additional market
dynamics that contribute to the long term profitability of the environmental R&D sector.
The cost of the innovation (CI) differs for each firm, especially if we assume that many
technologies will be developed. From the business literature, many examples of very cheap and
very expensive R&D projects can be found. Scherer and Ross (1990) conclude that it is useful
to think about R&D project costs in terms of a frequency distribution. In reality, this distribution
could turn out to be highly skewed but we will start working with a normal distribution like in
Figure I.
Figure I - Distribution of innovating costs for the environmental technology industry
In our threshold approach, only when the discounted profits from the innovation exceed the costs





will invest in R&D given a certain DPI can be found on the left side of DPI. It is clear that when
DPI increases, more firms will be prepared to invest in environmental R&D.
In our later simulation, we assume that each firm uses the same r for calculating DPI, that market
demand for the environmental technology is linear (pi = a - bqi) and that producing the
technology gains positive economies of scale (ci = d - eqi).
The calculation and evaluation of DPI is not restricted to the beginning of our simulation. We
consider it as a continuous process. Firms that have the potential to innovate are already familiar
with the technological needs of their future products. If they decide not to invest in environmental
R&D because the potential market is not attractive enough, they can wait and re-evaluate the
market during the coming years when new events like changed priorities in strategic management
of the polluting firms, unexpected price developments, scientific findings or goverment policies
have a significant impact. So it is possible that they decide to invest in environmental R&D some
years later and develop then a new technology.
2.3 Adoption of the new technology
After its development, we assume that the diffusion of the new technology will follow a pattern
of a threshold model. Like in Kemp (1997), we first attribute to the polluting industry a
willingness to pay (W) for the environmentally desirable innovation. In their investment decision,
these firms include the emission reduction achieved by the technology or the reduction of used
environmental inputs and the price level of the emission or environmental input.
Some firms can also include other elements like management priorities, the reduced risk for
environmental liabilities and/or penalties, positive impacts on the firms= image, etc. As a result,
we assume that this willingness to pay will be distributed normally.
If the willingness to pay exceeds the market price of the environmental technology pi, the firms
will be prepared to buy and install the new technology.
2.4 The market potential for environmental technologies
Firms will invest in environmental R&D if DPI exceeds CI. Polluting firms will buy the
environmental technology if W exceeds pi. The value of DPI depends mainly on the expected
maket reaction (pi, qi). The quantity of environmental technologies sold, qi, depends on the
effective need to reduce emissions. We therefore need to focus on the different impact each
environmental instrument has on the needed reductions of emissions by the polluting industries.
If the reduction target is ambitious, this will stimulate or even force these industries to install the
technologies presented by the innovating sector.
An instrument with only price implications, like environmental taxes, offers less certainty on the
effective reduction of emissions than quantity instruments like trabable emission rights. In the
case of environmental taxes, the innovating sector needs information on the expected tax level11
and the price elasticity for the demand of the taxed good. Additional problems are related to
built-in tax exceptions or rebates for industries that are very intensive in the use of the taxed
input. This is a very relevant element in many energy tax systems based on carbon content (see
the European proposal for a CO2 tax).
In the case of quantity instruments, there are clear emission reduction or emission stabilization
targets when the instrument is introduced. This reduction target can increase over time. The
environmental effectiveness and price implications of quantity instruments depend to a
significant extent to the initial (and annual) allocation of the permits. Are these emission rights
distributed for free (grandfathered) or are they auctioned?
A similar clear reduction target is included in most voluntary agreements proposed by industry.
Potential innovators can estimate their potential market for new technologies starting from  these
reduction targets that industry wants to achieve as a result of internal process changes and the
installation of bought environmental technologies.
When total emissions of a target group - like the most important utilities in a region - need to be
reduced by x percent, total sales of environmental technology (’ q) over the period of analysis
depend on the ratio (total emission reduction / reduction by new technology (RE)) ;
’ q = v(x(1+g)FEF)/RE,
  with F : number of facilities that need to reduce emissions ;
EF : emissions per facility ;
x : emission reduction target (%) ;
g : projected growth of industrial activity ;
RE : emission reduction (%) by the new technology ;
v : vintage effect with 0 < v < 1.
Economic growth (g>0) can lead to increased emissions in the business-as-usual scenario. High
growth of sectoral output could be positive for the potential sales of emission reduction
technologies, especially when auctioned quantity instruments are used and when the proportion
of emissions to output is relatively stable over time. In the case of price instruments, growth of
industrial activity can be anticipated by setting higher levels of the environmental taxes. It is
mostly assumed that as a result of the environmental taxes, the growth of industrial emissions
will be limited. This is however never certain and could be a partial explanation for the limited
environmental success of some environmental tax programmes.
The vintage effect indicates what fraction of the needed reduction will lead to the installation of
environmental technologies. Some firms will not invest in environmental R&D or technologies
because these new investments cannot be easily integrated into their long term investment cycle.
Investment planning follows here a vintage model. Other firms do not invest because they are not
interested in, or aware of, the environmental instrument. Finally, they also could just prefer to
buy emission rights on the market or pay the environmental taxes..12
The market for the environmental technologies is also influenced by the emission reduction
potential of the developed technologies. If the new technologies are very efficient - like in the
extreme case where they reduce plant emissions by 100% - the market will be readily saturated
with a low sales volume for the innovating firms. But when the technologies can only reduce
plant emissions by 10%, it will take much longer to achieve a significant reduction of emissions.
The price of the environmental technology (pi) is also depending on the emission reduction
potential. This is illustrated in Figure II where the price increases exponentially with the emission
reduction potential (RE). This pattern could develop when shadow prices of emissions increase
strongly over time (e.g. as a result of stricter emission reduction targets).
Figure II - Emission reduction potential and price of the technology
Very performant technologies will have a higher price that will compensate for the lower sales
volume. Presenting a radical technology to the market has the limitation of a smaller market in
terms of quantities sold and the higher business risk, but this is compensated by the reduced risk
for imitation or outperformance by better technologies. It is obvious that incremental
technological improvements are more vulnerable for outperformance by competing technologies.
3. Taxes versus permits
In a first step, we will use a part of our model to shed some light on the different market
incentives for technological innovation that result from using environmental taxes compared to
quantity instruments like tradable permits. We focus on the market potential created by the
choosen instrument. If the policy instrument turns out to be very expensive for the polluters, the




of the instrument is neglectable, the market potential for innovators is limited and the investment
in environmental R&D very risky.
Before we compare two instruments, it is necessary to define  the relevant characteristics of the
instruments. We will focus on the differences resulting from grandfathering (and not of 
auctioning) of tradable permits and environmental tax regimes that include (temporary)
exceptions for some heavy polluting or emitting industries.  
For industry, both environmental instruments will lead to a cost : paying taxes or buying permits.
In the case of taxes, emissions constitute the taxable base while in the case of grandfathered
permits, only the reduction of emissions will lead to costs to pay. This is a fundamental
difference and those who argue that industry will behave more or less similar towards both
instruments should consider this. But again, the latter conclusion is only relevant  when permits
are (each year) grandfathered based on past emission trends. When the permits are auctioned and
need to be bought from the initial instalment of the policy instrument, we can compare the
emission base for the environmental taxes with the spend budget for emission permits.
We worked out a basic simulation excercise to indicate the potential differences between taxes
and grandfathered emission rights. We want to stress that the difference depends on the period
of analysis. In a stable regulatory framework, taxes not only need to be paid this year but also
during  the coming years. Permits need to be bought over the complete period (i years) and the
foreseen reductions of emissions will strongly influence the demand for permits on the market.
We defined total tax and permit cost (i years) as :
Tax Cost  = t ’ (1+gi) (1- zi)FEF
Permit Cost =  pp ’ (1+gi) xiFEF
with  t  = environmental tax ;
gi = evolution in industrial growth over time ;
zi = evolution of exemptions from environmental taxes ;
xi = evolution of emission reduction over time (as % of initial emissions) ;
pp = permit price.
We assumed that the exemptions permitted in the tax policy will be reduced over time and that
emission reduction objectives in permit trading programmes will increase over time. The absolute
cap on emissions is held constant.
In our simulation for a period of 10 years, we started with 1000 firms (F=1000), each releasing
1000 tonnes of a substance (e.g. CO2 ; EF=1000). We kept these numbers constant and then
calculated tax costs and permit cost for 10 moments over a period of 10 years. Each calculation
for year i represents total costs if the time horizon of the instrument would be limited to the first
i years. For instance, we conclude from Table II that after 5 years during which taxes have been
paid and permits have been bought each year, the total cost of the tax programme would be $ 14514
million while the cost of the permit programme would be only $ 15 million for the emitting
industry. The tax progamme would be 9.59 times more expensive. So it is no surprise that in this
basic case,  industry would be  in favour of permit trading (after a free grandfathering) compared
to paying environmental taxes.
The calculations in Table II are based on a tax of $ 50, a permit price of $ 50, a percentage of tax
exceptions of 50% in the first year that will be reduced to 0% after 10 years and an emission
reduction target for the permit programme that starts at 3.5% for the first year and increases to
15% in the last year. The growth rate of industrial activity starts at 1.5% and increases to 3.5%.
After the first year, the difference is the greatest because after this year the cumulative permit cost
increases faster than the cumulative tax cost. However, the absolute difference between the two
policies per annum increases during the first years (26.16 - 1.77 = 24.39 difference for year 1 /
cost for permits in year 2 : 4.19 - 1.77 = 2.42 - cost for taxes in year 2 : 53.62 - 26.16 = 27.46 /
difference for year 2 : 27.46 - 2.42 = 25.04) . As a result, the cumulative values in Table II will
converge over time
Table II - Tax cost versus permit cost, $ mln (period of 10 years)
Year permit cost tax cost ratio (tax/permit)
1  1.77  26.16 14.71
2  4.19  53.62 12.79
3  7.37  82.64 11.20
4 10.95 113.05 10.32
5 15.17 145.58  9.59
6 20.19 180.01  8.92
7 25.74 215.63  8.38
8 31.70 254.02  8.01
9 38.08 305.86  8.03
10 45.27 357.90  7.90
Our calculations for Table II are of course parameter-specific. A different situation will develop
if exceptions for the environmental taxes change or when the permit price differs from the tax
price.  We therefore present in Table III the oucomes of the simulations for seven other scenarios.15
For each scenario, the values of the parameters and evolution patterns for the variables are given
below. Changes compared to the preceding scenario are presented in italic.
Scenario 1 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 50% -> 0% xi : 3.5% -> 15%
Scenario 2 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 30% -> 0% xi : 3.5% -> 15%
Scenario 3 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 30% -> 0% xi :   5% -> 40%
Scenario 4 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 30% -> 0% xi :   1% ->  8%
Scenario 5 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 10% -> 0% xi :   1% ->  8%
Scenario 6 : t=50 pp= 75  zi : 33% -> 0% xi :   1% -> 15%
Scenario 7 : t=50 pp=100 zi : 0% -> 0% xi :   5% -> 20%
 
Table III - Ratios of (tax cost / permit cost) for 7 scenarios
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Year 1 7.36 9.93 7.32 23.17 29.83 45.00 9.05
2 6.39 8.48 6.22 21.54 28.00 33.57 8.14
3 5.60 7.33 4.72 17.70 23.12 22.98 7.29
4 5.16 6.69 3.89 14.39 18.71 17.95 6.64
5 4.80 6.16 3.39 12.02 15.45 14.03 6.31
6 4.46 5.68 3.04 10.43 13.27 12.18 5.98
7 4.19 5.33 2.76 9.56 11.96 10.47 5.70
8 4.01 5.11 2.51 9.08 11.07 9.21 5.37
9 4.02 4.94 2.29 8.70 10.34 8.25 5.02
10 3.95 4.73 2.11 8.34 9.72 7.54 4.72
In each of the seven cases, permit prices are much higher than taxes and still the total cost of
taxes is much higher than the cost of the permit programme for the polluters. It is also no surprise
that each scenario leads to a different outcome. Tax programmes without exemptions are clearly
much more expensive for industry compared to buying permits for the share of emissions that
needs to be reduced. If we had taken the combination of a high energy tax with a cheap tradable
permit, the difference would be even more pronounced. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions,
the probability that we end up with very cheap permits is relatively high if Russia will be able
to sell its excess permits - resulting from the economic recession -  to the energy-intensive
developed countries.16
As a result, the different costs for industry resulting from both instruments clearly creates a
bigger market for environmental technologies in the case of environmental taxes. Only when the
permit price and the emission reduction objective are high (like in scenario 3), the total costs are
somehow comparable.
In this basic simulation, we did not include many other important aspects like the performance
of the technological innovation (in terms of reduced emissions), the price of the technology, scale
economies in the production of new environmental technologies, etc.
We will integrate these elements in the next sections.  
4. The general model
For a period of 15 years, we analyse the incentive to invest in environmental R&D by making
use of the assumptions used to define DPI and total sales of the new environmental technology
(Sq). For the first model runs in the base-line situation without an environmental policy
instrument implemented, there is only a reduction target for emissions that the innovating sectors
assumes to become the effective target in later policy frameworks. So there are no environmental
policy instruments used at this moment and we focus on the proportion of potential innovators
that will each year effectively invest in environmental R&D as it was presented in Figure I. We
will work out a graphical presentation for the total period of analysis. Therefore we need to
introduce CI, the cost of the technological innovation. We assume that CI consists of a fixed cost,
set at $ 1 million in our model, and a variable part since each product sold on the market will
result in some feedback from clients that demand for adaptations of the technology to their
specific demands.
We then define a new variable, R&D Incentive = (DPI - CI)/CI, to qualify the difference between
DPI and CI over time like used in Figure I.
We present our findings making use of the following settings : p=20000 - 0.03q ; c=15000 -
0.03q; RE = 0.2 + 2q/1000000 ; an industrial growth rate starting at 1.5% and increasing by 10%
(0.10 * 1.5%) each year; r1=0.33 ;  r2 =0.33 ; v = 0.75.
The reduction of the emissions is linked to the technological performance of the new technology
- in terms of emission reduction - what results in a sales estimate for the new technology. The
manufacturers then set initial prices and production costs that should both decline over time.
Only when the profits from future sales outweight the costs of the technological innovation by
a certain factor or baseline, manufacturers will start investing.
In Figure III, a sensitivity analysis was made for the variable R&D Incentive when the initial
reduction target - used by the innovating industries in their investment decision - ranges from 5%
to 25% with an increase by 10% each year. We notice that the value for R&D Incentive exceeds
1 in most cases. Industry is however aware of the many uncertainties surrounding the
environmental policy process and could therefore work with very short pay-back periods for
environmental investments or could require that R&D Incentives exceeds factor 5 before starting17
the new investment programme. Only when environmental policy instruments are implemented
by a transparent and stable regulation with detailed information for all involved parties, a
baseline set at 1 would sufficiently capture all uncertainties.
If the baseline was set at 5, and the reduction target starts at 5% of total emissions, there will be
no incentive to invest. The market created by the low reduction target is too small. For
entrepreneurs that are less risk averse, a lower baseline could be used. We also notice that the
incentive to invest increases over time. If industrial activity grows and the reduction target also
increases over time, the market for the new technology becomes more attractive. The price for
the technology will decline over time for various reasons - new entrants, outperforming new
technologies - what reduces the market attractiveness.
Figure III - R&D Incentive for 5 reduction targets
It is clear that the higher the reduction target for emissions, the more attractive the market for the
new technologies becomes. Similar findings can be found when we include a sensitivity analysis
for the parameter  r2 in our model. The initial and fixed value for  r2 was set at 0.33 but when
we include values from 0.2 to 0.6, the incentives for R&D change develop a same pattern as in
Figure III. The reduction of the uncertainty leads to a increased market for the environmental
technologies.
4.1 Environmental taxes on emissions
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or they can invest in new emission reducing technology. Their choice will depend on the relative
cost of both alternatives that are calculated in our model. As a result, the level of the
environmental tax and the price of the new technology are two crucial variables.
We first compare the total cost of the tax option with the total cost of the technology option.
We calculate the preference for technology as :
PrefT = (cost tax option) / (cost technology option)
For simplicity, we assume that every firms or industry needs to pay the tax : there are no
exceptions or preferential regimes. We did run the model for 10 levels of the environmental tax
: ranging from $ 25 per tonne emissions to $ 500 per tonne. The taxes are set to achieve a clear
environmental target in terms of a percentage reduction of emissions.
The results are presented in Figure IV. It is clear that in the cases with low tax levels, the cost of
paying taxes is lower  than the cost of investing in new environmental technologies as specified
in our model (PrefT <1). When environmental taxes exceed $ 150, paying taxes turns out to be
more expensive than investing in new technologies at the given market prices. In our situation
of an effective environmental policy with an increasing emission reduction target and a slowly
increasing environmental performance of the technologies, opting for investing in technology
becomes also more expensive over time. Only when technological progress would develop very
fast, all the lines in Figure IV would have positive slopes.
Over time, the emission reduction potential of the new technology increases but the demand for
new technologies will increase since the reduction target and industrial activity  also increase
over time. This growing demand for the emission reduction technologies leads to the declining
ratio of PrefT, even when the price of the technology decreases. Setting a reduction target that
changes over time requires a dynamic approach and for this objectives a fixed tax is a rather
arbitrary policy tool.
Figure IV - Preference for technology in the case of environmental taxes19
If we include these findings in the a priori investment decisions of the firms that can invest in
environmental R&D, the impact on our variable R&D Incentive might be significant. In Figure
V, we present our findings for tax levels from $ 25 to $ 500 per tonne emissions reduced. The
emission reduction target is not changed.
Figure V - R&D Incentive for 10 environmental tax levels ($25 -> $500)
Compared to Figure III, it is clear that high environmental taxes have the same incentive effect
as the highest reduction targets for emissions. Without the environmental taxes, the maximum
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used. High environmental taxes without exceptions provide clearly an attractive market even for
very risk averse investors.
4.2 Tradable emission permits
We repeat the same analysis when no taxes are used but tradable permits are introduced to reduce
total emissions by a certain percentage. Polluting firms can reduce emissions by installing new
technologies or they can buy permits if their emissions exceed a certain threshold. The preference
for technologies is calculated as the cost of buying the needed permits divided by the cost of
installing new environmental technologies. As could be expected - see section 3 -, it is more
expensive to introduce new technologies when permit prices are not extremely high. The highest
value for PrefT was 0.5 in the first year. For the other years, the value declines to 0.23.
The two crucial variables for our model with this instrument are permit price and the reduction
target for total emissions. In Figure VI, we present the model output for 10 permit price levels
- from $25 to $500 per tonne emissions - and a reduction target that starts at 10%. The highest
calculated value for R&D Incentive is 2.91 what provides a low incentive to innovate. If we set
the reduction target at 20%, the resulting model output is similar to Figure VI. The highest value
is in this case 5.38, still much below the incentive provided by environmental taxes..
Figure VI - R&D incentive for 10  emission permit prices 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1521
industry compared to introducing environmental taxes.
4.3 Voluntary agreements to reduce emissions
Another approach would be to negotiate a voluntary agreement with industry to reduce
emissions. This instrument offers the advantage to industry that environmental investments can
be optimally integrated into their long-term investment decision. For the innovating sector, this
agreement does not create immediately a market for new tecnologies, especially when the time
frame to accomplish the agreed reduction target is relatively long. Agreements offer however
another type of certainty to the innovating sector since industry needs to reduce emissions. This
compensates for the uncertainty on the existence of the future market for emission reduction
technology.
We included an approximation of the effect of voluntary agreements in our model by assuming
that the reduction of uncertainty - a higher value for r2 , the probability for a successful
commercialization - captures the impact on the incentive for environmental R&D.
2 varied from 0.33 to 0.66. Another possibility to
integrate the effect of voluntary agreements was by setting a higher price because industry surely
needs to invest in cleaner technologies and this dependency on future innovations could influence
price developments on the markets for these new technologies. This is however uncertain because
it could also be possible that the polluting industry selects certain partners that will benefit more
form the emission reduction programmes than external firms. In this latter case, the finding in
Figure VII are not valid for all firms in the industry.
From the results, it is clear that voluntary agreements create an incentive to innovating firms that
outweights our model simulations in the case of emission trading.
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4.4 Subsidies for technological R&D
Government could also opt for subsidizing R&D of environmental technologies. In principle, this
policy would provide a very strong incentive for the firms that will receive these subsidies. If new
entrants to the R&D market have no access to this funding, the subsidy could create a barrier.
We wanted to introduce the subsidy option in our model and therefore assumed that every firm
will receive the subsidy - or at least projects to receive this funding for the investment decision-
and that each firm receive the same amount. As a result, the subsidy reduces CI (the cost of the
environmental R&D). Since the incentive to invest depends on the difference between DPI and
CI, it is obvious that subsidies are important for the investment decision of innovating firms.
We introduced five levels of the subsidy; from no subsidies to a subsidy of $500000, each step
increasing by $100000.
We found that the value for R&D Incentive increased to 14.01 in the case of the highest subsidy.
When the subsidy was $400000, R&D Incentive amounted to 11.08 and with a subsidy of
$100000 the calculated value was 8.5. Compared to our findings in the case of emission trading,
subsidizing environmental R&D has a more interesting impact on the incentive to invest in new
technologies.
5. Conclusions
Environmental policy instruments have an impact on the incentives to invest in environmental
R&D and this link should deserve careful consideration when introducing new instruments.
Some authors argue that evironmental taxes and tradable permits have rather comparable impacts
on environmental R&D but we think that only very specific conditions  do lead to this kind of
conclusions. If we broaden the perspective by integrating elements from the Industrial
Organisation literature and depart for Pigouvian settings, a market-driven approach would link
the incentive to invest in new technologies to the market potential offered by the policy
instruments. If taxes turn out to be very expensive for the polluting or emitting industries, we can
assume that these targeted firms would be more interested to invest in new - emission reducing
- technologies than in cases where the choosen policy instrument will lead to a very limited cost.
We therefore developed a model that enables to compare the incentives on environmental R&D
resulting from taxes, emission trading, voluntary approaches and subsidizing environmental
R&D. We do not claim to capture all relevant market interactions, but our findings confirm the
intuition that environmental taxes have a clearly different impact on environmental R&D
compared to emission trading. The market - in terms of potentially avoidable costs -created by
environmental taxes is always more important than the market resulting from a system of tradable
permits that only captures emission reductions. This finding holds even when environmental
taxes are low and permit prices much higher. Only when permits would be auctioned from the23
beginning of the programme, the impact on the incentive for environmental R&D would be
comparable. We also found indications that other instruments like voluntary agreements and
subsidies for technological R&D have a more interesting impact on the incentive for R&D
compared to emission trading. In our model we could integrate and compare these four
instruments since we included the cost of innovation and various parameters for uncertainty.
Our final conclusion is that environmental taxes, without important exceptions or escape clauses,
offer the most clear incentives for the needed technological innovations.24
References
Biglaiser, G. and Horrowitz, J.K. (1995). Pollution regulation and incentives for pollution-control research. Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 3, pp.663-684
Hartman, R. S., Wheeler, D. and Singh, M. (1994). The cost of air pollution abatement. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper # 1398.
Huber, J. (1998). Sustainable development as a concept of ecological modernization - Towards industrial ecology.
Paper presented at the International Workshop on Ecological Modernization at the University of Helsinki, 10-13
September, 1998
Kemp, R.(1997). Environmental policy and technical change. A comparison of the technological impact of policy
instruments (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham)
Magat, A. W. (1979). The effects of environmental regulation on innovation. Law and Contemporary Problems
43(1), pp.4-25
Milliman, R. S. and Prince, R. (1989). Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Managment 17, pp.245-265
OECD (1997). Environmental policies and innovation : analytical framework. ENV/EPOC/GEEI(97)12
Palmer, K., Oates, W. E. and Portney, P. R. (1995). Tightening environmental standards : the benefit-cost or the no-
cost paradigm? Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4), pp.119-132
Parry, I. W. H. (1995). Optimal pollution taxes and endogenous progress. Resource and Energy Economics 15, pp.
99-149
Parry, I. W. H. (1996). The choice between emissions taxes and tradable permits when technological innovation is
endogenous. Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 96-31
Pizer, W. A. (1997). Optimal choice of policy instrument and stringency under uncertainty : the case of climate
change. Resources for the Future (paper, version of March 3, 1997)
Scherer, F. M. and Ross, D. (1990). Industrial market structure and economic performance (Houghton Mifflin
Company, Boston)
Stavins, R. N. (1996). Correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 30(2), pp. 218-232
Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41(4), pp.477-491